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When Mommy or Daddy is Gay: 
Developing Constitutional Standards 
for Custody Decisions 
by Paula A. Brantner" 
What standard should a court use in making child custody decisions 
when one parent is gay, lesbian, or bisexual? 
In this article the author examines the standards currently used by 
state courts in awarding child custody. She then analyzes the different 
ways in which a court factors in a parent's same-sex orientation in 
applying these different standards. Her examination of the bases for 
these decisions reveals that lower courts often rely on outdated informa-
tion or negative stereotypes about homosexuality. The author then 
considers how the application of these standards may violate the consti-
tutional rights of gay, lesbian, or bisexual parents. Finally, the author 
proposes the development and application of a federal direct adverse 
impact standard for custody decisions that would protect the best inter-
est of the child as well as the rights of the gay, lesbian, or bisexual 
parent. 
INTRODUCTION 
Divorce can be one of the most traumatic and stressful experiences a 
person will undergo in his or her lifetime. When the trauma of divorce is 
intensified by a battle over custody of one's children, the process be-
comes even more difficult. When someone involved in that process is at 
the same time dealing with issues of same-sex orientation, perhaps for the 
ftrst time, it is easy to see why gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals in-
volved in a dissolution of marriage may experience extreme pressure, 
since the issue of their sexual orientation could become a critical issue in 
the court proceedings. When gay and lesbian parents are forced to make 
* B.A. Michigan State University, 1989; University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law, Class of 1992. This Article was initially prepared for a seminar 
entitled "The Constitution and the Family," taught by Visiting Professor Leonard 
Strickman. The author would like to thank Andrea . Palash for reviewing drafts of this 
Article, and for providing guidance and wisdom. 
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the choice between their children and their partners, or when courts make 
that choice for them by imposing draconian restrictions based on myths 
about how homosexuality impacts child-rearing, the impact of divorce is 
particularly heartbreaking. 
This Article will argue that universal constitutional standards regard-
ing child custody cases and the gay parent are needed to ensure that ho-
mophobic biases do not prevent the best interests of the child from being 
fairly considered and to ensure that gay parents are not unfairly denied 
custody of their children. Parts I through III will examine the standards 
currently utilized in custody decisions involving gay and lesbian parents 
and will categorize custody decisions based upon the weight the court 
places on the parent's same-sex orientation. Part IV will demonstrate how 
current standards often rely upon scientifically unsupported and/or illogi-
cal stereotypes about homosexuality. Finally, Part V will question the 
constitutionality of these standards. Furthermore, this part will advocate 
the use of standards that do not rely upon bias but rather consider homo-
sexuality to the same extent as any other factor already considered by the 
courts. The paper will conclude that these revised standards are warranted 
not only for their superior constitutional value, but also for their more 
equitable results where gay, lesbian, and bisexual parents are concerned. 
I. GAY, LESBIAN, AND BISEXUAL PARENTS· 
Approximately three to five million lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals 
in this country are parents, and approximately eight to ten million chil-
dren are currently being raised in gay households.2 Currently, the majori-
ty of parents who are gay and lesbian had children while involved in a 
marital or non-marital heterosexual relationship.3 This relationship may 
have existed before the parent was cognizant of her or his same-sex ori-
entation, or before he or she acknowledged it to others. This Article will 
focus on custody disputes involving children from previous heterosexual 
marriages. Breakups of same-sex relationships also give rise to custody 
battles, and cases involving biological and non-biological parents are 
increasingly litigated.4 
1. This Article uses the tenns "gay" and "gay, lesbian, and bisexual" interchange-
ably to refer to persons with a same-sex orientation. The tenns "nongay," "straight," 
and "heterosexual" are also used to refer to the parent who is not oriented towards 
someone of the same sex. The use of the tenn "homosexual" is avoided, as some 
(including the author) feel the word has negative, clinical, and sex-focused conno-
tations. 
2. ROBERTA ACHTENBERG, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE at 1 (National Center for Lesbian Rights, 1987). 
3. [d. 
4. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); Nancy S. v. 
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Custooy battles involving gay, lesbian, and bisexual parents are prob-
ably the most frequently litigated of lesbian/gay rights issues, yet most 
cases remain relatively invisible.5 Custody cases often do not go further 
than the trial court level, and therefore are mostly unreported.6 Parties 
may choose not to appeal cases favorable to the gay, lesbian, or bisexual 
parent, since these cases are more likely to have been decided on grounds 
related to parenting, and not on bias or other grounds warranting appeal. 7 
Those cases which are appealed often result in decisions unfavorable to 
the gay parent, creating a negative body of precedent that makes others 
less likely to challenge the disposition of their own cases.8 In addition, 
for a custody case to be overturned on appeal, the appellant must demon-
strate that the trial court not only made an incorrect decision, but abused 
its discretion by doing so, which is a difficult standard to meet. 9 Finally, 
appellate litigation is time-consuming and expensive. Parents may not 
have the fmancial resources to challenge adverse results, especially at a 
time when their emotional resources are drained as well. 10 
n. CURRENT STANDARDS FOR CUSTODY DECISIONS 
A. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
The standard which is almost universally applied by courts faced with 
child custody decisions is the "best interests of the child" standard. 11 
While the standard itself is vague, it has generally been interpreted to 
Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1991); See also Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does 
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian 
Mother and Other Non-Traditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 3458 (1990). 
5. Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE 
L. REv. 311, 327 (1980-81). 
6. [d. 
7. Out of thirty-two reported custody cases surveyed, only twelve were initially 
favorable to the gay parent. Of those, four were overturned on appeal due to the 
insufficient weight given the parent's sexual orientation. Of the twenty cases initially 
won by nongay parents, only three were overturned in favor of the gay parent. NA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LIST OF REPORTED CASES BY STATE (1988) 
[hereinafter NCLR LIST]. 
8. Gay parents lost at both trial and appellate levels in seventeen of the thirty-two 
cases reported, with an additional four cases lost at the appellate level. NCLR LIST, 
supra note 7. 
9. See, e.g., D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.B. 2d 286, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (illustrating 
the difficulty of meeting the abuse of discretion standard). Only three of twenty 
custody cases initially unfavorable to the gay parent have been overturned upon 
appeal. NCLR LIST, supra note 7. 
10. Donna Hitchens, Social Attitudes, Legal Standards & Personal Trauma in Child 
Custody Cases, 5 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 89, 94 (1979-80). 
11. Jeff Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate 
Courts, 18 PAM. L.Q. 1, 4 (1984). 
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mean that if a conflict exists between the rights of the parents and the 
court's perception of the child's best interests, the conflict must be re-
solved in favor of the child's interests. 12 This doctrine has gradually re-
placed the traditional "tender years" custody standard, whi~h presUlned 
that custody by the mother was always in the best interest of young chil-
dren, if not all children. 13 
When making the "best interests" determination, courts usually rely 
on considerations such as: (1) which parent the child has lived with since 
the parents' separation; (2) the fmancial resources of each parent; (3) the 
home environment each parent will provide; and (4) whether one parent 
is better able to provide for any special needs the child may have. 14 In 
order to make the custody decision they feel will be best for the child, 
courts have a great deal of discretion to weigh these factors and any oth-
ers they deem relevant. These additional considerations often will include 
the past and present sexual activity of both parents. If one parent is gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual, sexual activity almost certainly will be considered. IS 
B. CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
Courts employ a different standard when parents return to court to 
ask for modification of the original custody order. In addition to the best 
interests determination, a parent seeking modification must demonstrate to 
the court that there has been a change in circumstances substantial 
enough to warrant modification. 16 States vary regarding what types of 
changes affect the child to the extent that modification is necessary, but 
since the purpose of a higher standard of proof is to prevent frequent 
shifts in custody between parents, the change in circumstances usually 
must involve the child or custodial parent, and not merely the noncustodi-
al parent. 17 For example, a change in the financial situation of the non-
custodial parent which raises her or his income higher than the other 
parent would not be sufficient to warrant uprooting the child, because 
then the child could go back and forth between parents each time one 
parent received a raise. However, if the custodial parent became seriously 
ill, or remarried and moved to a new home, the noncustodial parent 
would generally be entitled to have the custody decision reevaluated. 
12. Steve Susoeff, Note, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay 
or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REv. 852, 853-54 
(1985). 
13. Atkinson, supra note 11, at 12. 
14. Hitchens, supra note 10, at 92. 
15. Hitchens, supra note 10, at 94; NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION AND THE LAW 1-9 (Roberta Achtenberg & Mary Newcombe eds., 3rd prtg. 
1990) [hereinafter NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD]. 
16. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-11. 
17. Atkinson, supra note 11, at 5. 
~ 
j";''''',-,' 
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The above standards negatively affect gay and lesbian parents more 
than heterosexual parents. Since homosexuality has been a key factor in 
many decisions favoring the nongay parent, it is generally raised and 
considered whenever a gay parent is a party. 18 The rights of gay people 
become secondary to the consideration of the child's welfare when the 
court believes that a parent's same-sex orientation can never be in the 
best interests of the child. The court presumes the child will be adversely 
affected, regardless of individual circumstances. If a gay parent obtains 
custody initially without revealing her or his same-sex orientation to the 
court, either deliberately or because the parent was unaware of her or his 
orientation, the nongay parent is very likely to reopen custody proceed-
ings once the same-sex orientation of the custodial parent is revealed. 
Courts often consider the revelation of homosexuality to constitute a 
change of sufficient weight to warrant custody modification. 19 
m. CATEGORIES OF CUSTODY DECISIONS 
In each custody decision in which a parent's same-sex sexual activity 
is a factor, consideration of that activity may be categorized by one of 
three standards: (1) conclusive disqualification standard: a parent's homo-
sexuality is automatically presumed to make her or him an unfit parent; 
(2) presumptive unfitness standard: there is a rebuttable presumption of 
unfitness, which may be overcome if the parent conforms to behavioral 
guidelines designed to minimize what is perceived as the "negative im-
pact" of parental homosexuality; or (3) direct adverse impact stan-
dard/nexus test: parental homosexuality will not be considered a signifi-
cant factor, unless there is a rmding of present adverse impact on the 
child.20 
A. CONCLUSIVE DISQUALIFICATION STANDARD 
While the facts may differ from case to case, whenever the court 
employs a conclusive disqualification standard the results are always the 
same: if the court is aware that one parent is gay or lesbian, that parent 
will not receive custody. 21 A parent's same-sex orientation alone man-
dates the conclusion that he or she is an unfit parent, regardless of the 
parent's relationship status, whether the parent is openly gay in the con-
18. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-11. 
19. Id. at 1-11; see also EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIEN-
TATION AND THE LAw 124 (1990) [hereinafter HARVARD LAW REVIEW EDITORS]. 
20. Nora Lauennan, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 647, 654 (1977); see also Robert A. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving 
the Homosexual Parent, 22 PAM. L.Q. 71, 74-77 (1988). 
21. This approach is also called the "per se" test by some commentators. See 
Beargie, supra note 20, at 74. 
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text of the family, or whether any impact on the child whatsoever is dem-
onstrated. Courts are free in most states to ignore contrary expert testimo-
ny by merely stating that the decision was made in the best interests of 
the child, and can disregard any testimony of family, friends, or social 
workers that demonstrates not only that lesbians and gay men can be 
capable parents, but that the gay parent seeking custody would be the 
best custodial parent. 22 
Roe v. Roe23 and G.A. v. D.A.24 are typical examples of cases that 
employ the conclusive disqualification standard. In Roe, the father re-
ceived custody following the mother's bout with cancer. During this time 
the mother was physically unable to care for her daughter, and so relin-
quished custody to the father in a consent decree. Nearly four years after 
the father gained custody, the mother became aware of her ex-husband's 
gay relationship with the man who shared the house with her daughter 
and ex-husband. She challenged the award of custody, and the trial court 
modified the decree to grant the parents joint custody. The modification 
was conditional upon the father not sharing a bed with his partner while 
the child was present in the home. The trial court found the child to be 
"a very happy child (who) seemed to be well adjusted and outgoing" and 
found no evidence showing that her father's homosexuality had any ad-
verse effect.2s This factor, however, was not taken into consideration by 
the appellate court, which granted sole custody to the mother. The court 
rationalized that "the father's continuous exposure of the child to his 
immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and improper custo-
dian as a matter of law .... The father's unfitness is manifested by his 
willingness to impose this burden upon (his daughter) in exchange for his 
own gratification. ,,26 
In G.A. v. D.A., a Missouri case, a lesbian mother appealed the initial 
grant of custody of her son to his father. The appellate court denied the 
challenge, holding that "a court cannot ignore the effect which the sexual 
conduct of a parent may have on a child's moral development. ,,27 This 
decision was based on the fact that the lesbian mother lived with her 
partner and occasionally hugged her in front of the son.28 There was a 
22. See, e.g., L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 243-45 (Mo. ct. App. 1982) (trial court 
found that expert evidence, including articles from various journals, portions of books, 
and statistical studies dealing with homosexuality was not credible. "[The facts of this 
case] strip the scientific literature of its facade of statistics and in its application to 
this case reduce it to nonsense."). 
23. Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985). 
24. G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. ct. App. 1987). 
25. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 691-92. 
26. Id at 694. 
27. G.A., 745 S.W.2d at 728. 
28. Id It is likely, however, that even if she lived separately from her partner and 
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thoughtful dissent by Judge Lowenstein, who observed that, "[w]ith all 
the evidence here pointing to the best interests of the child being served 
in the mother's custody, her homosexual conduct should not automatically 
call for another result.,,29 A later case, S.LH. v. D.B.H., fmnly estab-
lished Missouri's conclusive disqualification standard, stating that "plac-
ing primary custody of a minor child with the nonhomosexual parent is 
in the best interests of the child.,,30 
In cases employing the conclusive disqualification standard, all other 
factors affecting the child's best interests tend to be ignored once the 
issue of a parent's homosexuality is raised. If factors such as fmancial 
situation or home environment are considered at all, their value is mini-
mized to a considerably greater extent than if homosexuality were not an 
issue. For example, in G.A., the child had his own bedroom while living 
with his mother, while his father slept in a one-room cabin and provided 
only a cot for the child.31 If the mother were not a lesbian, it seems cer-
tain that the living conditions provided by each parent would be signifi-
cant. Since she was involved with someone of the same sex, however, the 
court stated that "[the mother's] argument seems to be that this court 
should overlook her sexual orientation and award custody solely on the 
basis of which parent would provide the better house. ,,32 
Another example of the conclusive disqualification standard is the 
court's failure to consider the improved fmancial situation of a gay parent 
who lives with a partner. Although gay parents living with partners may 
be able to provide more fmancial resources for the child, they are gener-
ally less likely to be successful in a custody determination than a gay 
parent who lives alone, or a nongay parent who does or does not live 
alone.33 Any fmancial benefits which might accrue are either not consid-
ered or are greatly outweighed by the perceived negative impact of the 
child's exposure to the parent's partner. Courts look favorably, however, 
at a nongay parent who remarries or enters into a relationship that im-
proves the parent's fmancial situation.34 Courts employing the conclusive 
disqualification standard appear so obsessed with homosexuality that all 
other factors become virtually irrelevant, and thus do not warrant mention 
never demonstrated any affection toward her in her child's presence, she would still 
not be able to retain custody if the conclusive disqualification standard was applied. 
29. Id. at 730. 
30. S.L.H. v. D.B.H., 745 S.W.2d 848, 849-50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (mother was 
permitted to retain custody only because the court did not believe allegations that she 
was a lesbian). 
31. G.A., 745 S.W.2d at 729. 
32. Id. at 728. 
33. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-19. 
34. Donna 1. Hitchens, Contested Child Custody and Visitation Issues, panel pre-
sentation at Lavender Law II (Oct. 6, 1990). 
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in their view. 3S 
B. PRESUMPTIVE UNFITNESS/REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION STANDARD 
This approach, sometimes described as a "middle ground" ap-
proach,36 presumes that a parent's homosexuality tends to negatively af-
fect the child.37 Unlike the conclusive presumption, however, under this 
approach courts will allow the gay parent to overcome the negative pre-
sumption. Most courts will allow the presumption to be overcome only if 
the parent agrees to minimize the child's exposure to homosexuality. On 
the face of it, the courts applying this standard focus on the sexual activi-
ty involved in being homosexual, rather than the status of being gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual. Thus, courts applying this standard will prohibit 
same-sex activity and require the gay, lesbian, or bisexual parent to agree 
to specific behavioral guidelines. The gay or lesbian parents who agree to 
the restrictions are able to overcome the detrimental effect their sexual 
orientation would have upon custody only by forgoing expression of their 
sexuality. Often the gay parent may lose custody by failing to follow the 
conditions imposed by the court. 38 
Another use of the presumptive unfitness standard is to mask the 
court's bias against granting custody to a gay or lesbian parent. These 
courts claim that they are willing to award custody to a gay or lesbian 
parent in appropriate cases, but in the particular case before them the 
parent has failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that no negative ef-
fect would result from awarding custody.39 Significant in these deci-
sions, however, is the absence of any clear assertion of what the appro-
priate case would be. 
In both these applications of the presumptive unfitness standard, 
courts have retained their biases against homosexuality but have been 
influenced by society's willingness to accept homosexuality to the extent 
35. Hitchens, supra note 10, at 92. Most of the reported cases deal exclusively 
with the issue of sexual orientation. Occasionally, a court will claim that homosexuali-
ty is not solely the basis for the decision, but homosexuality, coupled with other 
factors in the case, tips the scale in favor of the nongay parent. See, e.g., Bark v. 
Bark, 479 So. 2d 42, 42-43 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985); Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 
510, 513-14 (Ark. App. 1987). 
36. See Beargie, supra note 20, at 75; L. Lee Dowding, Note, Immoral Because 
They're Bad, Bad Because They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptions of 
Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes, 26 CAL. WESTERN L. REv. 395, 409 (1990). 
37. Lauerman, supra note 20, at 657. 
38. The same denial or restrictions imposed in custody cases are even more com-
monly applied to visitation cases. Of twenty reported cases involving visitation rights 
of a gay parent, fifteen placed some restriction on the parent's visitation (most com-
monly, no overnight visitation, or parent's partner not allowed to be present). NCLR 
LIST, supra note 7. 
39. See, e.g., Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 9-10 cPa. Super. o. 1985). 
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that it is hidden and does not challenge dominant nonns. 
Most presumptive unfitness cases purport to be based upon the sexual 
behavior of the gay, lesbian, or bisexual parent. 40 Those who might fmd 
distinctions based solely on the status of the parent's homosexuality unac-
ceptable may readily accept distinctions based upon conduct. While courts 
may attempt to distinguish between status and conduct in presumptive un-
fitness cases, they tend to disregard the distinction when issuing the cus-
tody decision. 
If courts place restrictions regarding sexual activity on gay parents 
that would not be imposed upon heterosexual parents, then courts are 
actually basing the custody decision upon the parent's status as gay, les-
bian, or bisexual, not the parent's conduct as a sexually active adult. The 
court's statusfbehavior distinction becomes merely a pretext for a decision 
based upon status. Heterosexual parents are not routinely asked to forgo 
sexual relationships with other adults to obtain possible custody of their 
children - lesbian and gay parents are.41 
Inappropriate sexual behavior around children by any parent should 
be discouraged by the court to the extent that exposure to such behavior 
is obviously not in the child's best interest. The problem lies, however, 
with courts that consider any display of affection between adults of the 
same sex, including hand-holding and hugging, to be overtly sexual and 
inappropriate.42 Meanwhile, the same behavior between heterosexual 
40. See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 
911 (1981) (noting the potential hann to the child due to social stigma and isolation 
resulting from mother's overt lesbianism); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d at 242-43. 
41. Hitchens, supra note 10, at 94. Compare N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 
186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (same-sex relationship "voluntarily chosen") and L v. D., 
630 S.W.2d at 244 (parent "refused to give up [gay] lifestyle.") with Wilhelmsen v. 
Peck, 743 S.W.2d 88, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (mother's extramarital heterosexual 
cohabitation insufficient to warrant change of custody). Cj Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at 
512 (court claims both heterosexual and homosexual "illicit" (non-marital) relationships 
would be treated in same way). But see Ketron v. Aguirre, 692 S.W.2d 261 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 1985) (custody granted to mother living with married man with order that living 
arrangements be terminated). See also Sheppard, Lesbian Mothers II: Long Night's 
Journey Into Day, 8 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 219, 231 (1985) (in fourteen of sixteen 
cases that lesbian mothers lost, the mother had a partner); Robert G. Bagnall et at., 
Note, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court System: Homosexual Panic, 
Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 497, 525 (1984). 
42. See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d at 65 (exchanging vows and rings); S.E.G. v. 
R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (showing affection in front of 
children and sleeping together in the family home); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 
967 (Okla. 1982) (had "wedding," held hands in child's presence); Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 
693 ("flaunting" relationship by sharing bed in home) (see supra notes 23-26 and 
accompanying text); In the Matter of the Marriage of Cabalquinto, 718 P.2d 7 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1986) (striking trial court's order that father limit association with partner 
during visitation); J.L.P. (H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 871-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) 
(taking child to church where many members were gay and to activist social meet-
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adults is not considered to negatively affect the child. Thus, even though 
the court cites the "behavior" of the gay or lesbian parent as being the 
deciding factor, because that behavior would not be a factor when a het-
erosexual parent is involved, the decision is actually based upon the sexu-
al orientation of the parent. 43 In addition, since gay men and lesbians 
are unable legally to marry their same-sex partners, courts that negatively 
view any non-marital relationship, whether same-sex or opposite-sex, 
impose an additional burden on gay parents, who are unable to legitimize 
their relationships by marrying their partners. 44 
Presumptive unfitness decisions generally involve restrictions on the 
presence of a same-sex partner in the household, but may sometimes even 
prohibit any exposure of the child to the parent's partner. The parent may 
be prohibited from involvement in gay organizations or churches, or even 
from associating with other gay persons while the child is present. A. v. 
A. is a typical presumptive unfitness case.45 The father in this case had 
assumed custody upon the parents' divorce. The mother had not main-
tained any relationship with her children during the eleven years between 
the divorce and the motion to modify. The father had admitted to "possi-
ble homosexual traits and tendencies" after the initial custody determina-
tion,46 yet he was permitted to retain custody because the evidence did 
not show any exposure of the children to "deviant sexual acts," nor was 
any adverse effect upon the children demonstrated. The court responded 
to the motion to modify by ruling that the father was prohibited from 
having a partner live in the family home, and that his custody would be 
placed under the supervision of the juvenile authorities.47 
N.K..M. V L.E.M.48 is a presumptive unfitness case with more adverse 
results for the gay parent than those in A. v. A. The lesbian mother was 
initially granted custody, provided that her partner was never allowed in 
the presence of her daughter. When the condition was violated, the father 
sought and was granted custody. The court found that the daughter's best 
ings). 
43. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-19. See also Atkinson, 
supra note 11, at 29 ("A [heterosexual] parent who has a relationship of which the 
child might be aware, but refrains from engaging in sex when the child is home, will 
also usually not lose custody."). 
44. See, e.g., Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at 512-14; Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694 (supra notes 
23-28 and accompanying text). 
45. A. v. A., 514 P.2d 358 (Or. App. 1973). 
46. Id at 359. 
47. Id at 360-61. 
48. N.K.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). While this case uses pre-
sumptive unfitness language, the result would have been the same had the court 
employed the conclusive disqualification standard used in later Missouri cases. See 
supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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interests were not served by any association with her mother's partner. To 
ensure further contact did not occur, the father was awarded custody. "9 
The court did not acknowledge that nongay parents are not routinely 
expected to prevent their partners from becoming part of the family.~ 
Thus, gay parents are forced to make impossible and intolerable deci-
sions. Parents who fail to comply with the court's restrictions may lose 
their children. If they do comply, they may lose their partners or the 
ability to be openly gay and to maintain contact with other gay persons, 
which takes its own psychological toll.51 Nancy Polikoff, a frequent 
commentator on gay and lesbian custody issues, states that, "the more we 
[lesbians, gay men and bisexuals] appear to be part of the mainstream, 
with middle-class values, middle-of-the-road political beliefs, repressed 
sexuality, and sex -role stereotyped behavior, the more likely we are to 
keep custody of our children. ,,52 Even those who do not subscribe to 
these values but are willing to put forth this appearance in order to main-
tain custody may fmd that courts are extremely predisposed against 
them. 53 
C. DIRECI' ADVERSE IMPACI' STANDARD 
The direct adverse impact standard, also called the nexus test, re-
quires a court to fmd that the parent's homosexuality adversely affects the 
child before custody will be denied. 54 Under this test, the gay or lesbian 
parent begins on a more equal footing with the nongay parent. Instead of 
having to prove that homosexuality does not and will not affect the child, 
the burden of proof is shifted to the nongay parent, who must conclusive-
ly demonstrate that the other parent's homosexuality is presently affecting 
the child in a negative way. Courts employing this standard have recog-
nized that it is no more valid to presume a gay parent is automatically an 
unfit parent than it was to presume that the female parent was automati-
cally the most fit parent, as was held under the "tender years" approach 
49. N.K.M., 606 S.W.2d at 183. 
50. Hitchens, supra note 10, at 94. 
51. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15. 
52. Nancy Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles, Legal 
Challenges, 14 N.Y.V. REv. L. & Soc. ClI. 907 (1986). 
53. See, e.g., Anagnostopoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 317 N.E.2d 681, 683 (TIL Ct. 
App. 1974) (mother who drove a motorcycle, was not religious, had gay friends, was 
possibly gay herself, and wanted a career was not entitled to custody. The court ex-
pressed its disdain for the mother as "one of the members of the current avant-
garde."). 
54. Lauerman, supra note 20, at 658; Beargie, supra note 20, at 76-78. The use of 
this standard was advocated by Nan Hunter and Nancy Polikoff in Custody Rights of 
Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and litigation Strategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 691, 
714-15 (1976). 
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formerly employed by courts." 
Doe v. Doe employs this adverse impact standard. 56 In Doe, the par-
ents had joint legal custody, with physical custody primarily exercised by 
the father. When a conflict arose between the two parents, the father 
petitioned for sole legal and physical custody, based on his ex-wife's 
relationship with the woman who shared her home. The court here pre-
sumed that the mother's lesbian relationship alone was not a valid reason 
to preclude her from retaining joint custody. After considering testimony 
by psychiatrists, the court concluded that "[t]here is no evidence to show 
that the wife's lifestyle will adversely affect [the child]."" Since there 
was no showing of direct adverse impact upon the child, homosexuality 
was not a factor in the custody decision. 
In re Marriage of Birdsall also demonstrates the courts' use of the 
nexus teSt.'8 Mr. Birdsall, a gay parent, was not allowed to have any 
third party known to be gay present during his child's visitation. The 
court vacated the order containing the restriction, holding that "[n]o cur-
rent harm to the child can be attributed to [the father's] sexual orienta-
tion. And there is no evidence of future detriment . . . . Evidence of one 
parent's homosexuality without a link to detriment to the child, is insuffi-
cient to constitute harm. ,,'9 The court also strongly rejected unfounded 
biases apparently relied upon by the lower court in making its decision. 
The lower court had concluded that even the father considered his life-
style harmful to his child, based on the fact that he had stated that he 
would not raise his son to be gay. The lower court also concluded that 
the child would be negatively impacted by the conflict between the 
father's homosexuality and the mother's religious beliefs.60 The appellate 
court disagreed with the inference that the father believed his lifestyle 
harmful, and found that the mother's religious condemnation was not an 
adequate basis to deny custody. 61 
IV. MYTHS ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY AFFECTING 
CUSTODY DECISIONS 
When courts use either the conclusive disqualification standard or the 
rebuttable presumption standard instead of the direct adverse impact stan-
dard, the court's rationale for choosing the standard often includes the use 
55. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
56. Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293 (Mass. ct. App. 1983). 
57. Id at 296. 
58. In re Marriage of Birdsall, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024 (1988). 
59. Id. at 1031. 
60. Id at 1030. 
61. Id 
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of one or more myths about the relationship between an individual's ho-
mosexuality and her or his fitness as a parent. Although these myths have 
been empirically disproven, courts will often reject scientific research by 
simply stating that homosexuality is bad and will be harmful to the 
child,62 or by discounting expert testimony that does not support its re-
sult. 63 Continuing to educate the judiciary may help in this regard. How-
ever, Nancy Polikoff feels that educating the judiciary has accomplished 
little, since even in recent cases where a great deal of expert testimony 
and scientific data was presented to counter myths about homosexuality, 
courts have still found reasons to doubt the credibility of this evidence. 64 
The following are the most common myths surrounding homosexuality, 
and thus the myths most often articulated in child custody cases. 
A. HOMOSEXUALITY AS MENTAL ILLNESS 
Courts often view lesbian and gay parents as mentally unstable, and 
thus unfit to care for their children.65 However, researchers have con-
cluded that there is no evidence that homosexuals as a group are more 
neurotic, unhappy, or psychologically maladjusted than heterosexuals 
living similar lives.66 In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association re-
moved homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses, stating that "homo-
sexuality per se implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability 
or general social or vocational abilities. ,,67 The American Psychological 
Association has issued a policy statement which affmns that "sexual ori-
entation of natural . . . parents should not be the sole or primary variable 
considered in custody . '. . cases. ,,68 In short, there is no basis for the 
conclusion that homosexuality equals instability. Therefore, courts should 
rely upon individualized determinations of each parent's mental and emo-
tional stability instead of automatically concluding that the gay, lesbian, 
or bisexual parent is the least stable of the two parents contesting custo-
62. N.KM., 606 S.W.2d at 186. 
63. See J.LP.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 868-69; see also supra note 22. 
64. Nancy Polikoff, Contested Child Custody and Visitation Issues, panel presen-
tation at Lavender Law IT, (Oct. 6, 1990). 
65. See, e.g., Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980) (rejects trial 
court's conclusion that lesbian mother unstable); see also Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at 512 
(court relies on testimony regarding prior instability despite evidence of stability 
during marriage). 
66. ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, Homosexualities: A Study of Diversity 
Among Men and Women (1978). 
67. Susoeff, supra note 12, at 872 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 
D.S.M. ill: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3rd ed. 
1980». 
68. I.I. Conger, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, for the 
year 1976: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Council of Representatives, 32 
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 432 (1977). 
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dy. 
B. SEXUAL ORIENTATION OF CHILD 
Another common myth about homosexuality is that children exposed 
to homosexuality on an extensive basis will "become" gay themselves. 69 
Underlying this belief is an assumption that heterosexuality is preferable 
to homosexuality, and that it would be negative for children to emulate 
their gay parents. This assumption is one that many people would dis-
pute.70 This myth is illogical since it fails to explain how so many chil-
dren raised by heterosexual parents "acquired" their homosexuality, since 
most gay individuals were raised in heterosexual households. 71 
Scientific studies of children raised by gay parents have conclusively 
shown that there is no higher prevalence of homosexuality in those fami-
lies than in heterosexual families. One study comparing lesbian and sin-
gle-parent households found "no differences in terms of gender identity, 
sex role behavior, or sexual orientation.,,72 Another researcher who stud-
ied only households of gay and transsexual parents found that "all [the 
children] have developed a typical sexual identity, including heterosexual 
orientation. ,,73 
Perhaps what courts actually fear is that when a child is raised in a 
household where homosexuality is clearly acceptable, the child may grow 
up more aware of his or her own sexual orientation. If the child is gay, 
she or he may be less likely to fear the stigma of coming out than a 
child raised in a heterosexual household, and thus may be more likely to 
be openly gay at a young age.74 However, those youths who are not 
aware of or feel unable to reveal their sexual orientation are no less gay 
69. See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d at 66 (appellate court accepted court-appointed 
psychologist's testimony as to daughter in dispute "having difficulties in achieving a 
fulfilling heterosexual identity of her own"); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E. 2d 983, 986 
(Ohio App. 1987) (rejects heterosexual mother's contention that child will become gay 
through exposure to gay father); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d at 186 ("who would 
place a child in a milieu where she may be inclined toward [homosexuality]?"). 
70. M. Neil Browne & Andrea Giampetro, The Contribution of Social Science Data 
to the Adjudication of Child Custody Disputes?, 15 CAP. U. L. REv. 43, 47 (1985); 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW EDITORS, supra note 19, at 129. 
71. ACHTENBERG, supra note 2, at 3. 
72. Susan Golombok, Ann Spencer, & Michael Rutter, Children in Lesbian and 
Single Parent Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 4 J. OF CIULD 
PSYCHOL. AND PSYCHIATRY AND APPLIED DISCIPLINES 551, 571 (1983). 
73. Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Trans-
sexual Parents, 135 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 692, 696 (1978). 
74. This appears to be one of the concerns in M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 968 ("If homo-
sexual behavior is legalized, and thus partly legitimized, an adolescent may question 
whether he or she should 'choose' heterosexuality. At the time their sexual feelings 
begin to develop, many young people have more interests in common with members 
of their own sex."). 
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than their openly gay counterparts. 
Children raised in openly lesbian or gay households may learn to 
accept and admire homosexuality, or any other form of diversity, without 
necessarily being gay or lesbian themselves. Educating the courts is criti-
cal. Courts must be shown that sexual orientation is determined at an 
early age,7S and that custody by gay parents will not affect the child's 
sexual orientation, but in fact may serve to benefit the child by strength-
ening the child's acceptance of diversity in him or herself and in oth-
ers.76 
C. ABUSE OR MOLESTATION BY GAY PARENTS 
Another myth damaging to favorable custody determinations involv-
ing gay parents is the belief that gay parents are more likely to abuse or 
molest their children. Evidence does not support this myth. Research 
shows that heterosexual males constitute the overwhelming majority of 
those who sexually abuse children (generally their daughters), and that 
women rarely molest children.77 Courts still seem willing to accept the 
myth, however, and either restrict custody or visitation rights on this 
basis, or deny gay and lesbian parents custody altogether.78 Occasional-
ly, parents have even been denied the opportunity to interact with their 
children without another adult present ostensibly to monitor their behav-
ior.79 The sensationalism of our nation's press when reporting incidences 
of homosexual child molestation further perpetuates this myth; one is led 
to believe that only gay people molest children even though, as indicated, 
heterosexual father/daughter molestation is much more common. 
D. LIKELlliOOD OF CONTRACTING AIDS FROM GAY PARENT 
Another myth is that AIDS can be transmitted through casual contact, 
or the hugging and kissing present in parent/child interaction. It can-
not. 80 Nevertheless, trial courts have requested gay parents to undergo 
75. See infra p.38 and note 118. 
76. Bagnall et al., supra note 41, at 534. 
77. See, AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, CHn.DREN'S DMSION, PROTECTING TIm 
CHILo VICfIM OF SEX CRIMEs COMMITIED BY ADULTS 216-17 (Y. DeFrancis ed., 
1969), cited in ACHTENBERG, supra note 2, at 13 (97% of sex offenders against 
children are male, and 90% of victims are female). 
78. See, e.g., J.L.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 867, 869 (court refused to believe testimony 
that 95% of adult molestation is heterosexual, and instead asserts, "[e]very trial 
judge . . . knows that the molestation of minor boys by adult males is not as un-
common as the psychological experts' testimony indicated."). 
79. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E. 2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio App. 1985) (re-
manded with recommendation that visitation by father take· place in presence of 
mother, or other "sufficiently controlled" circumstances to shield the children from 
their father's homosexuality). See also Hitchens, supra note 10, at 94. 
80. Gerald H. Friedland, Brian R. Saltzman, Martha F. Rogers, et aI., Lack of 
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HIV antibody testing or have restricted custody of a gay parent because 
they fear that the child is at risk by living with a gay parent, even if that 
parent is not mv positive. 81 Even though lesbians as a group are the 
least at risk for contracting AIDS (less so even than heterosexual par-
ents82), lesbians have also been affected by AIDS misinfonnation.83 
E. STIGMA OR HARASSMENT OF CHILD 
The fmal myth about child custody by gay parents is that the child 
will be subject to stigma or harassment by her or his peers if the gay or 
lesbian parent obtains custody. 84 
This assumes a number of factors which mayor may not actually be 
present in each child's particular situation; however, courts often proceed 
as if the child is automatically subject to stigma both now and in the 
future. This myth presumes that other children in the community are 
aware of their playmate's parenting situation. Many children may be un-
aware, however, that a same-sex couple is raising their friend, or may not 
understand that some attach a moral stigma to homosexuality. It also 
presumes that if others are aware of the parenting situation, they will 
stigmatize the child. In fact, they may not disapprove or care. 
Another presumption is that stigma and harassment will be lessened if 
the gay parent does not have custody. If the presumption is that stigma 
will follow the child of the gay parent, the stigma would not be lessened 
if the child does not live with that parent because the mere existence of a 
gay parent could cause the child to be stigmatized.8s Yet another pre-
sumption is that any stigma will be hannful to the child, and that such a 
stigma will outweigh the benefits conferred by custody in the hands of 
the parent otherwise best suited to custody. 86 Researchers have found 
Transmission of HTLV-III/LAV Infection to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS 
or AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 N. ENGLAND J. MEn 344 (No. 
6, Feb. 6, 1986); Merle A. Sande, Transmission of AIDS, The Case Against Casual 
Contagion, id. at 380. 
81. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 987; Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 963-66 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1988); Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 725 (Sup. Ct. 1988). 
82. AClITENBERG, supra note 2, at 4 (citing telephone conversation with CDC offi-
cial). 
83. HARVARD LAW REVIEW EDITORS, supra note 19, at 127, n. 64. 
84. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981); M.J.P. 640 P.2d at 
969; contra M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (an excel-
lent examination of the purported effects of stigma and harassment). 
85. See M.P., 404 A.2d at 1262 (concludes that stigma would not be lessened if 
the nongay parent had custody, since "children's exposure to embarrassment is not 
dependent upon the identity of the parent with whom they happen to reside"). 
86. Id. ("Within the context of a loving and supportive relationship, there is no 
reason to think that the girls will be unable to manage whatever anxieties may flow 
from the community's disapproval of their mother."). 
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that only about 5 percent of children who have lived with an openly gay 
parent have been harassed by other children.87 In addition, researchers 
have found no connection between a parent's same-sex orientation, or any 
resulting stigmatization, and the development of emotional problems in 
children. 88 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF 
THE LESBIAN/GAY PARENT 
The existence of a federal constitutional standard specifically govern-
ing lesbian and gay custody cases, or generally governing all custody 
cases, would be invaluable. A constitutional standard based on equal 
protection, privacy, or freedom of association grounds would provide a 
guideline for courts that might otherwise resort to personal bias to reach a 
decision, and would provide a strong basis for appeal when lower courts 
ignore the standard and make biased decisions. 
A cautionary note is in order, however. Child custody cases do not 
often hinge upon constitutional issues, and those who represent gay and 
lesbian parents should not neglect treatment of the gay parent's individual 
parenting situation in order to focus upon constitutional issues.89 Consti-
tutional grounds are most effective when used to strengthen the gay 
parent's case, but should not be the sole focus. If the court's decision is 
to be based upon the superior ability to parent, the attorney will want to 
ensure success on those grounds by making a strong argument on behalf 
of the gay or lesbian parent. 90 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide any case involv-
ing gay parents and child custody, so the merit of the following argu-
ments have not been determined by our highest court. Therefore, courts 
are free to accept or reject these arguments by distinguishing them from 
cases already decided by the Supreme Court. 
Attorneys furthering gay rights claims may be reluctant to approach 
the· current Supreme Court after the adverse result in Bowers v. 
87. Brian Miller, Gay Fathers and Their Children, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR 544, 548 
(Oct. 1979). See also Green, supra note 73, at 695. Harry Zelinka, an evaluator and 
mediator for the Office of Family Court Services in Santa Clara County, also asserts 
that stigmatization is quite rare in the custody disputes with which he has been 
personally involved. Presentation at BALIF Family Law Conference (November 17, 
1990). 
88. Martha Kirkpatrick and Donna Hitchens, Lesbian MotherS/Gay Fathers, in 
EMEROINO ISSUES IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw (Elissa P. Benedek and 
Diane H. Schetky eds., 1985). 
89. Hunter and Polikoff, supra note 54, at 725. 
90. ACHrENBERG, supra note 2, at 6 (application of a nexus standard would permit 
a decision on the grounds of parenting ability). 
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Hardwick,91 which contained inflammatory rhetoric against homosexual 
sodomy. However, some lower federal courts have been willing to grant 
gay men and lesbians constitutional rights.92 Success may also be possi-
ble at the state court level,93 as custody decisions remain in state courts 
unless appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
A. EQUAL PROTECTION 
1. Constitutionality of Custody Decisions Based on Biases 
The 1984 United States Supreme Court case of Palmore v. Sidoti94 
may have particular relevance to the situation of gay parents seeking 
custody. In Palmore, the mother lost custody of her daughter to her ex-
husband after she married an African-American. Chief Justice Burger, in 
his Supreme Court opinion, cited heavily from the trial court's holding, 
presumably to decry its egregiousness. The trial court claimed, "the 
wife ... has chosen for herself and for her child, a life-style unaccept-
able to the father and to society," and that "[the mother's choice of a 
black spouse] tended to place gratification of her own desires ahead of 
her concern for the child's future welfare. ,,95 The basis for the trial 
court's decision was that "it is inevitable that [the child] will ... suffer 
from the social stigmatization that is sure to come.,,96 The language used 
by the trial court here is likely to be found in almost every case that has 
been decided adversely to a gay parent. 
The Supreme Court strongly rejected the trial court's analysis. While 
the Court recognized the risk that the child would be subject to "pres-
sures and stresses not [otherwise] present,,,97 it held that "[t]he question, 
however, is whether the reality of private biases and the possible injury 
they might inflict are permissible considerations for removal of an infant 
child from the custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty 
concluding that they are not. ,,98 This was a unanimous decision, so there 
can be no doubt that the Court strongly believes that "[p]rivate biases 
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indi-
91. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
92. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Security Clearance Of c., 668 F. Supp. 1361 
(N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in 895 F.2d 563 (9th Circ. 1990); Watkins v. United States 
Anny, 847 F.2d 1329 (Wash. 1988), vacated and affirmed on other grounds, 875 
F.2d 699, cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990). 
93. See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (1985); Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983; 
M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1986). 
94. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
95. Id. at 431. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 433. 
98. Id 
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recdy, give them effect.,,99 
Palmore may be distinguished in that it involved a racial classifica-
tion which the Court had already found required "most exacting 
scrutiny."I00 Given the result in Bowers v. Hardwick/o l where the 
Court failed to recognize how sodomy laws adversely impact gay men, 
lesbians, and bisexuals, the Court seems less likely to determine that 
sexual orientation discrimination warrants such a high level of scrutiny, if 
it deserves heightened scrutiny at all. However, given the passion of the 
language in Chief Justice Burger's opinion, and the unanimity of the 
Court, it is certainly reasonable to assume that any biases that interfere 
with a true determination of the child's best interests will be found un-
constitutional. Palmore should preclude application of the conclusive 
disqualification standard or the rebuttable presumption standard to the 
extent that custody limitations are founded upon bias. 
Some state courts have already deemed Palmore applicable to a cus-
tody decision involving a gay parent. 102 The Alaska Supreme Court, in 
1985, cited Palmore when it ruled that, "it is impermissible to rely on 
any real or imagined social stigma attaching to the mother's status as a 
lesbian. ,,103 Perhaps it is not overly optimistic to believe that as more 
research is conducted, and more education of society in general takes 
place, courts will be able to recognize the irrationality of their personal 
biases and attempt to exclude them from an evaluation of what is truly 
best for the child. 
2. Constitutionality of Irrebuttable Presumptions 
Courts that presume that no gay parent can be a fit parent by using 
the conclusive disqualification standard employ an irrebuttable presump-
tion that is constitutionally questionable in light of the United States Su-
preme Court decision of Stanley v. Illinois. 104 Mr. Stanley was denied 
any rights to custody after his children's mother died because he had not 
been married to her. The state of lllinois operated under the presumption 
that unwed fathers were unfit, and thus no hearing to determine actual 
fitness was necessary before the children were declared wards of the 
state. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this presumption, fIDding that the 
state had denied Stanley due process of law by denying him a hearing. 
The Court further found that by distinguishing between unwed fathers and 
all other parents, the state had denied Stanley the equal protection of the 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 432. 
101. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186. 
102. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
103. S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 879. 
104. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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laws guaranteed to him under the Fourteenth Amendment. lOS 
The Court in Stanley detailed a line of cases that demonstrated that 
parents clearly have an interest in raising their children.106 Next, the 
opinion cites past cases that have found blanket exclusions based on one 
particular factor to be unconstitutional. A statute depriving military per-
sonnel of the right to vote in Texas was unconstitutional because "[i]t 
viewed people one-dimensionally. .. when a fmer perception could 
readily have been achieved by assessing a . . . claim . . . on an individu-
alized basis. ,,107 The Court then declared, "when, as here, the procedure 
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it ex-
plicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it need-
lessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent 
and child."l08 
Those who consider the precedent of Stanley inapplicable for gay 
parents seeking custody seek to limit its applicability to situations in 
which a hearing is not available or is specifically denied. Since gay par-
ents have their day in court (albeit an often unpleasant and unsatisfactory 
one), constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment would be satis-
fied. However, a hearing is useless to a gay parent if the court utilizes an 
irrebuttable presumption, just as a hearing would have had little benefit 
for Mr. Stanley if the policy was to deny unwed fathers custody. 
Another possible means of distinguishing Stanley from gay parent 
cases is that the irrebuttable presumption in Stanley was a state policy, 
instead of legal precedent. However, although no custody statute contains 
on its face the irrebuttable presumption that all gay parents are unfit, the 
discretion provided by these statutes effectively permits the courts to 
employ such a presumption. 109 In states that appear willing to deny all 
gay parents custody, such as Missouri,110 there is little difference be-
tween a policy provided to adjudicators by the legislature and a body of 
judicial precedent consistently relied upon to produce results adverse to 
gay parents. The result is the same: the irrebuttable presumptions will 
preclude custody. Indeed, one could argue that an irrebuttable presump-
tion promulgated by a legislature, as in Stanley, is more deserving of 
judicial deference than a presumption created by court cases. Thus, use of 
an irrebuttable presumption, whatever its origins, violates procedural due 
process, as well as equal protection principles. III 
105. Id. 
106. Id at 651. 
107. Stanley, 405 u.s. at 655, citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
108. Id. 
109. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-65. 
110. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
111. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-64. 
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3. Traditional Equal Protection Analysis 
a. Strict Scrutiny 
117 
When a court applies equal protection analysis, it must ftrst detennine 
whether the government's action is "rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental purpose. ,,112 Since almost any actions taken by trial courts 
in relation to custody matters would probably meet such a minimal stan-
dard, it is necessary to determine whether a higher standard should apply. 
If a suspect class is involved, the action will be subject to strict scru-
tiny.1l3 While homosexuality has yet to be established as a suspect clas-
sification, sexual orientation shares many characteristics with other sus-
pect classifications, such as race and national origin. If strict scrutiny is 
applied, then the classification must serve a "compelling" governmental 
goal.114 The classification must also be "precisely tailored" to the gov-
ernmental interest at issue. lIS 
There are a number of factors that characterize a suspect classifica-
tion. They include: (1) a history of discrimination; (2) discrimination 
based upon inaccurate stereotypes; (3) traditional exclusion from the polit-
ical process; and (4) immutability of the characteristic. 116 Sexual orien-
tation qualifies as a suspect classification in all these regards. 
To determine whether there has been a history of discrimination, the 
courts "look to whether the class has faced a 'history of purposeful un-
equal treatment. ",117 Lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals qualify in this 
regard. Laws, court decisions, and societal attitudes all either explicitly or 
implicitly suggest that discrimination against gay men and lesbians is 
permissible. Lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals also suffer from inaccurate 
stereotyping, as documented in Part IV. 
While gay men and lesbians are beginning to have some influence on 
the political process, as a group they have traditionally been excluded 
from that process. Indeed, even nongay politicians who align themselves 
with gay issues subject themselves to political liability. Finally, while 
there is still some debate about the causers] of sexual orientation, it is 
generally agreed that same-sex orientation is not changeable and is estab-
lished at an early age; 118 thus, it is immutableY9 If homosexuality is 
112. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). 
113. Id. 
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considered a suspect classification, then governmental action must serve a 
compelling interest. 
Custody decisions based upon the best interests of the child would 
likely constitute a compelling interest. Decisions that focus on the evils of 
homosexuality and fail to consider the best interests of the child should 
not survive a strict scrutiny standard since their reliance on conjecture 
and myth is inappropriate. 120 A blanket exclusion of all gay parents is 
also not narrowly tailored, since it permits the opposing parent to have 
custody regardless of whether that parent is fit or whether custody by that 
parent is actually in the child's best interests. For example, a conclusive 
disqualification standard excludes' gay parents who are not sexually active 
and whose same-sex orientation is not known to the child, while allowing 
nongay parents whose sexual activity is harmful to the child to obtain or 
retain custody. Therefore, if sexual orientation is considered a suspect 
classification, governmental policy precluding custody by gay parents 
does not survive the strict scrutiny test. 
It is difficult to persuade courts that sexual orientation should be a 
suspect classification. Some federal trial courts have been willing to do 
so, but have later been overturned at the appellate level. 121 Courts have 
been reluctant to expand the number of suspect classifications, and may 
have special difficulty doing so when the classification is as intensely 
debated as homosexuality. In addition, once sexual orientation is consid-
ered a suspect classification all forms of discrimination, including em-
ployment, housing, and military discrimination, will have to be eliminated 
throughout our legal system. Rather than take such a drastic step, courts 
may prefer to follow a lesser standard of scrutiny, or solve the problem 
of custody on alternative constitutional grounds. 
b. Intermediate Scrutiny 
States that deny custody to parents with same-sex partners, yet allow 
parents with opposite-sex partners to obtain custody, discriminate on the 
basis of gender, since parties are treated differently based on the gender 
of their companions. The gender-based classification is not negated by the 
fact that men and women are equally affected. Both Loving v. Virginia 
(prohibiting interracial marriage)l22 and McLaughlin v. Florida (prohib-
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iting interracial cohabitation)l23 held that statutes applying race-based 
classifications are a form of racial discrimination. It follows that if gen-
der-based classifications are employed, it results in gender discrimination, 
which should warrant an application of intermediate level scrutiny. 124 
The standard for intermediate level scrutiny, as articulated by the 
Supreme Court, is that the classifications employed must be related to 
achieving an important governmental interest. 125 Few would dispute that 
determining the best interests of the minor child is an important govern-
mental interest. However, decisions that neglect the best interest of the 
child and instead focus upon the court's unfounded beliefs regarding the 
dangers of homosexuality no longer operate to protect that important 
governmental interest. It may well be in the best interests of the child to 
be placed in the custody of the gay parent. Some may argue that protect-
ing traditional family values are important governmental objectives in and 
of themselves. However, objectives that further a particular mor-
al/religious viewpoint, but at the same time restrict the rights of any mi-
nority group, should not warrant such deference. Use of a nexus standard 
would keep the focus upon the best interest of the child and ensure that 
only this important governmental interest was considered. 
B. PRIVACY 
Bowers v. Hardwick makes it difficult to sustain a privacy argument 
on behalf of the gay parent. If states are free to criminalize sodomy, 
states would be able to impose restrictions on those who presumably 
engage in criminal acts without violating their right to privacy. However, 
Hardwick may be distinguished. First, while states may criminalize the 
act of sodomy, presumably they are unable to criminalize the status of 
homosexuality.l26 Since custody cases may be decided without any evi-
dence of actual same-sex activity, those decisions adverse to the gay par-
ent are actually based on the parent's status as gay, lesbian, or bisexu-
al. 127 Second, while Hardwick was based upon a federal constitutional 
right to privacy regarding homosexual conduct, custody cases are decided 
in state courts, under state statutes and constitutions. The particular state 
in which custody is being adjudicated may have an explicit or implicit 
right to privacy which may extend beyond those granted by the federal 
constitution. 128 The right to privacy in that state may preclude unwar-
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ranted intrusion by the state into the parent's sexual activity. 
Finally, the additional factors of marriage, families, and children are 
present, which may be sufficient to negate Hardwick. The Court in 
Hardwick failed to fmd a right to privacy for homosexual sodomy since 
such a right was not related to marriage, procreation, or the family. 129 
However, since a custody detennination necessarily involves all of these 
factors, custody detennination cases are more similar to Griswold v. Con-
necticut,l30 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 131 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 132 
which limit the state's ability to interfere with the fundamental rights of 
the family. 
While the state has a compelling interest in protecting the health and 
welfare of children, this compelling interest does not justify the use of 
the conclusive disqualification standard. Since there is no nexus per se 
between homosexuality and harm to children, the intrusion is unwarranted 
in the overwhelming majority of cases where no specific harm is articu-
lated. Therefore, only the direct adverse impact standard, which requires 
that a nexus be demonstrated, should be pennissible under current privacy 
doctrine. 
C. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
Cases applying the rebuttable presumption approach often utilize re-
strictions on custody or visitation that limit the gay parent's ability to 
associate with other gay and lesbian individuals. The gay parent may not 
be pennitted to live with her or his lover, have the lover or other gay 
individuals in the presence of the child, or attend meetings of gay orga-
nizations or churches. 133 These restrictions unduly interfere with the gay 
parent's right to free association. 
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the right of associ-
ation in the case of NAACP v. Alabama, stating that any governmental 
action which has the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate "with 
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, religious, 
and cultural ends" is subject to the closest judicial scrutiny}34 In addi-
tion, the Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees recognized a right of 
"intimate association.,,13s This right "afford[s] the fonnation and preser-
vation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial mea-
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sure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State. "136 
While in the Jaycees case the discussion involved the right of organi-
zations to decline to admit women, a number of commentators have ar-
gued that this right should apply to relationships between parents and 
their same-sex companions. 137 Some courts have recognized that this 
right, coupled with the above-mentioned privacy rights, precludes the 
court's intrusion into intimate matters. One California Court of Appeal 
found it "intrusive upon the privacy and associational interests of the 
mother" for the lower court to condition custody upon her not having any 
male guests.138 While courts retain the right to investigate the associa-
tions of the parent that might possibly impact the children and impose 
restrictions if necessary to promote the child's welfare, these restrictions 
are often imposed with minimal investigation and with no showing that a 
particular relationship is harmful. Instead the court assumes that any ex-
posure to homosexuality is sufficient to warrant restriction. 139 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Gay and lesbian child custody cases that utilize rebuttable or irrebut-
table presumptions rely heavily on bias. Presumptions should be rejected 
in favor of a direct adverse impact, or nexus, standard, where harm 
caused by parental same-sex orientation must be demonstrated before that 
orientation is a factor in the custody decision. Utilizing a direct adverse 
impact standard would result in a more fair result for gay and lesbian 
parents. In addition, the result is more likely to comport with constitu-
tional principles of equal protection, privacy, and freedom of association. 
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